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CONTRACTS-PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATION ABROGATING THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSIDERATION IN w HOLE OR IN PART*-Consideration is the test evolved by our law for separating enforceable informal
promises from those that are unenforceable. The doctrine of consideration has frequently been criticized,1 but it is so firmly established that
most of the recent proposals for change have been addressed to the
legislatures. The purpose of this discussion is to consider proposed
legislation both as to its possiple operation and as to the future e:ffect
of the_ proposals on the basic doctrine of consideration.
Proposals to do away with consideration in certain cases
A critical observer could produce much authority for the proposition that consideration is not necessarily required in order that an informal promise may have legal consequences. Both Professor Williston and the Restatement set forth many situations in whi~ promises
I.

*

This is the first in a series of related comments in the law of Contracts and
Restitution, to be published from time to time throughout volume 46 of the REviEW•
.1 For theoretical discussion see SELECTED READINGS oN THE I.Aw OF CONTRACTS
320-618 (1931); Whittier, "The Restatement of Coµtracts and Consideration,"
18 CAL. L. REv. 6II (1930); Wright, "Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to be
Abolished," 49 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1936); Corbin, "Recent Developments in Contracts," 50 HARv. L. REV. 449 (1937); Sharp, "Promissory Liability," 7 UNIV, CHI.
L. REv. 250 (1940); and the series of articles in 41 CoL. L. REv. 777-876 (1941).
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are enforced without consideration.2 If a convincing case is presented it
is quite probable that a court will not require consideration or will
apply the test in a manner not supported by prior decisions. The New
York Law Revision Commission 3 and the English Law Revision
Committee~ have presented certain fact situations in which the present
law is highly uncertain, and have recommended that the requirement of
consideration be abolished in these situations. As to what the situations
are the two bodies substantially agree. New York has adopted a comprehensive legislative program pursuant to the recommendations of the
commission/ but the English parliament has not taken any action on
the recommendations presented to it. The- correlation of :findings in
the two investigations suggests that future legislative programs may
develop along the lines there suggested, and a discussion of the proposals and of the practical effects thereof that can be observed should
beof value.
a. lrre'1.Jocable offers. Both the English 6 and the New York.,. commissioners agreed that the needs of business require a simple method
for making offers irrevocable. As the common law now stands an offer
may be revoked prior to acceptance unless it is made for consideration
or, in some jurisdictions, under seal.8 The New York statute on offers
reads as follows:
''When hereafter an offer to enter into a contract is made in
writing signed by the offeror, or by his agent, which states that the
offer is irrevocable during a period set forth or until a time :fixed,
the offer shall not be revocable during such period or until such
time because of the absence of consideration for the assurance of
irrevocability. When such writing states that the offer is irrevocable but does not state any period or time of irrevocability, it
2

I.WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,§§ 138-204 (1936); I CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT,
§§ 85-94 (1932). See also New York Law Rev. Com., Leg. Doc. 65D, pp. 62-70
(1936); Shattuck, "Gratuitous Promises--A New Writ?" 35 MICH. L. REv. 908
(1937).
a New York Law Rev. Comm., Leg. Doc. 65C, 65D (1936); id., Leg. Doc. 65M
(1941).
~ Great Britain, Law Rev. Comm., 6th Int. Rep. (1937).
ii N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law (McKinney, 1945) § 243, N.Y. Personal
Property Law (McKinney, 1945) § 33; N.Y. Real Property Law (McKinney, 1945)
§ 279. For comment on the program see Hays, "Formal Contracts and ConsiderationA Legislative Program," 41 CoL. L. REV. 849 (1941); Lloyd, "Consideration and the
Seal in New York-An Unsatisfactory Legislative Program," 46 CoL. L. REv. 1
(1946).
6
Great Britain Law Rev. Comm., 6th Int. Rep., 1f 50 (6) (1937).
7
New York Law Rev. Comm., Leg. Doc. 65M, pp. 11-33, 529 (1941).
8
I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 50 (1936); I CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §§ 35,
+6, 47 (1932); 17 C.J.S., Contracts,§ 55.
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shall be construed to state that the offer is irrevocable for a reasonable time." 9

,

Under this statute a serious problem of construction is apparent.
Is an offer irrevocable which reads, "I offer to sell you Blackacre for
$Io,ooo. This offer is to remain open thirty days"? It is doubtful that
this offer contains an assurance of irrevocability. Perhaps the courts
will require a statement in so many words that an offer is irrevocable.
The New York statute contains a manifest ambiguity which should be
avoided by other jurisdictions ·contemplating similar legislation.
A different problem regarding offers is that of an offer for a unilateral contract which is revoked before full performance, but after the
offeree has completed part of _the performance required. The New
York Commission recognized this problem but made no specific recommendation.10 The English committee followed the doctrine of the
'Restatement and recommended that a binding contract be deemed to
have beeIJ. made after the offeree has' partially performed, the contract
being conditional on completion of the performance.11 This solution
of the problem has been criticized because it leaves one party to a
transaction free while the other is bound even though the transaction
was at all times intended to be an exchange.12
b. Past consideration. The two reports also agree that promises
should be enforceable if supported by past consideration.13 Generally
such promises are not enforceable,14 but there are numerous exc:eptions.15 Two criticisms of the common law rule are that a promise given
in return for past benefits is more'likely to be relied on than is a purely
gratuitous promise, and that often a promisor may have every intention
of going through with a promise but may die before completing per9 N.Y. Personal Property Law (McKinney, 1945) § 33 (5); N.Y. Real Property
Law (McKinney, 1945) § 279 (4).
10 New York Law Rev. Comm., Leg. Doc. 65D, pp. 58-59 (1936).
11 Great Britain Law Rev. Comm., 6th Int. Rep., 1f 50 (7) (1937); l CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 45 (1932).
'
12 Shattuck, "Gratuitous Promises--A New Writ?" 35 MICH. L. REv. 908 at
935-40 (1937).
.
13 Great Britain Law Rev. Coipm., 6th Int. Rep., 1f 50 (2) (1937); N()W York
Law Rev. Comm., Lge. Doc. 65M, pp. 51-52 (1941). The most desirable effect foreseen by the English Committee was that of making enforceable a promise of guaranty of
a pre-existing debt.
14·1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, § 142 (1936); 17 C.J.S., Contracts,§ u6.
15 I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§ 142-150 (1936); 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §§ II7125. Most of the situations listed in the references in note z, supra, involve promises
based on past consideration. In _Webb v. McGowan, 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 S. 196
(1936), 232 Ala. 347, 168 S. 199 (1936), valuable benefit actually received would
be enforced. See also 53 L.R.A. 353 (1901); 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 520 (1910); 5 CoRN.
L. Q. 450 (1920); 21 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 341 (1946).
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formance, leaving the promisee with no possible recourse against a personal representative. The New York statute reads:
"A promise hereafter made in writing and signed by the
promisor or his agent shall not be denied effect as a valid contractual obligation on the ground that consideration for the promise is past or executed, if the consideration is expressed in the
writing and is proved to have been given or performed and would
be a valid consideration but for the time when it was given or performed." 16
Under the statute a test of consideration must be applied as of a
past time. Not everything which a promisor considered valuable can
support a subsequent promise. For example, a promise to pay an annuity to one's parents in return for support furnished during minority
would appear to be unenforceable under the statute,17 but an identical
promise made to an aunt or to a stranger would probably be binding.
It is pertinent to inquire whether there is any reason to retain a vestige
of the doctrine of consideration when so great a change is made. If the
promisor mentions something in the ·writing as consideration should
that not be enough?
What is the effect of a•promise given for a completed performance
under a prior contract with the promisor, if the consideration for the
original promise has already been received by the promisee? Suppose,
for example, that after a surgeon has been fully paid such miraculous
results follow from an operation that extra compensation is promised.
The performance rendered could have been sufficient consideration at a
time in the past. A similar fact situation was presented in one case and
the court declared that a contract could not be modified after full performance so as to fall within another section of the New York statute
but mad~ no mention of the section on past consideration. The promise
was held to be unenforceable.18
c. Modification of a contract. By the weight of authority a promise
to perform an existing legal duty, or the actual performance of such a
duty, cannot serve as consideration to support a promise.19 A promise
to pay additional compensation for the completion of a contract is
usually not enforceable, nor is a prom~se to extend the time for pay16 N.Y. Personal Property Law (McKinney, 194JS) § 33 (3); N.Y. Real Property Law (McKinney, 1945) § 279 (2).
17 The parent is under a legal duty to support the child. See note 18, infra.
18
Aldine Metal Products Co. v. Bogert and Carlough Co., 270 App. Div. 897,
61 N.Y.S. (2d) 71 (1946).
19
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 130 (contractual duty), §§ 131-132 (1936)
(duties imposed by law); I CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 76a (1932); 17 C.J.S.,
Contracts, §§ 110-113.
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ment of a debt given in return for the debtor's agreement to pay. It is
true that the rule is easy to circumvent either by a slight alteration of
the duty to be performed or by the rescission of a prior agreement and
substitution of a new contract imposing added burdens on only one
party.20 A related rule is that which has been called the Rule in Pinnel's Case 21 or the Rule of Foakes v. Beer,22 to the effect that a liquidated debt cannot be discharged by the payment of less than is due. 21
This latter rule also can be avoided by a modification of the terms of
payment,M and has been repudiated by decision or by statute in many
jurisdictions.211
The argument in favor of the rules mentioned above is that they
serve to protect against extortion.26 A contractor who is building a
building for a man who needs it badly for business purposes might refuse to proceed unless 2romised more money. A debtor might present
his creditor with the alternatives of taking part of the debt or of prosecuting a suit for the whole amo-µnt and probably failing to collect. The
problem of extortion, however, is one of economic duress rather than .
of consideration. Duress remedies should be available even though the
requirement of consideration has been satisfied by one of the expedients
suggested above~ The consideration rules do not provide an adequate
protection, and the problem should be met by extension of relief for
economic duress.21
Each of the rules mentioned here has been criticized on a theoreti20 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, §§121, 130A (1936); 29 GEo. L. J. 5m (1941);
4r MICH. L. REV. 327 (1942). Williston states that the recission of the prior contract
must precede the formation of the ·new one, but courts will not often scrutinize the
time element too closely. See Sasso v. K. and G. Realty Co., 98 Conn. 571, 120 A.
158 (1923); 33 YALE L. J. 78 (1923).
21
5 Co. Rep. 117a, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (1602).
22
L.R. 9 A.C. 605 (1884).
28
1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, § 120 (1936); 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §§ II2, 127;
1 CoNTRAcTS RESTATEMENT, § 76 a, c (1932).
24 1· WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, § 121 (1936) and cases cited.
211 Id., § 1.20, note 8 (decisions), note 9 (statutes). In Central London Property
Trust v. High Trees House, Ltd., [1947] I K.B. 130, the court held that such an
agreement when acted upon was conclusive and discharged the debt.· See Gold, "The
Present Status of the Rule in Pinnel's Case," 30 Ky. L. J. 72 (1941), id. 187 (1942};
14 IND. L. J. 260 (1939); 16 WASH L. REV. 42 (1941).
26 See discussion in Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578,
15 s.w. 844 (1890).
21 See Jaeger v. Canter, (N.Y. 1939) 13 N,.Y.S. (2d) 414, and Pozar v. Daum,
259 App. Div. 455, 19 N.Y.s: (2d) 634 (1940), to the effect that duress is available
as a defense to a modification agreement under the statute. The problem of duress was
discussed by the Law Revision Commission, New York Law Rev. Comm., Leg. Doc.
65D pp. 199-205 (1936). For a discussion of extension of remedies for economic
duress see Dawson, ''Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective," 45 MICH. L. REv.
253 (1947).
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cal basis,28 but the most telling criticism is that they operate to invali-

date genuine bargains. A promisee might well prefer performance at
a higher price to a judgment for damages. A creditor might recover
more, if he accepts a part payment or grants additional time, than he
could get by suing the debtor. The English committee recommended
the abrogation of both rules. 29 The New York commission submitted a
recommendation which was adopted by the legislature in the following
language:
"An agreement hereafter made to change or modify, or to discharge in whole or in part, any contract, obligation, or lease, or
any mortgage or other security interest in personal or real property, shall nqt be invalid because of the absence of considerati(?n,
pr.ovided that the agreement changing, modifying, or discharging
such contract, obligation, lease, mortgage, or security interest
shall be in writing and signed by the party against whom it is
sought to enforce the charge, modification, or discharge, or by his
agent."~ 0
The statute puts an end to the Rule in Pinnel's Case if the subsequent agreement is reduced to writing.81 It does not operate as a complete abrogation of the rule relating to performance of existing legal
duties. A modification of an existing contract which is burdensome to
only one of the parties will be enforced without consideration, but the
law is not changed as to performance of a duty imposed by law as consideration nor as to the enforceability of a promise by a stranger to a
contract in return for one party's performance of the contract.
This section of the statute has been construed in several decisions.
In Mermelstein v. RealJy Associates Securities Corp. 82 a letter signed by
the party against whom a modification was sought to be enforced was
not given effect because the court found no agreement between the
parties. This decision appears unsound because acceptance is usually
28

See discussion New York Law Rev. Comm., Leg. Doc. 65D pp. 163-2o6
(1936); opinion of Lord Blackburn in Foakes v. Beer, L.R. 9 A.C. 605 at 614 (1884);
criticisms cited I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 120, note 7, § 130A (1936).
29
Great Britain Law Rev. Comm., 6th Int. Rep., 1f 50 (3), (4) (1937). The
committee made clear that it might be held to be against public policy to allow additional compensation for legal duties such as those of the police.
so N.Y. Personal Property Law (McKinney, 1945) § 33 (2), N.Y. Real Property
Law (McKinney, 1945) § 279 (1). This identical section has been adopted in Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937 and Supp.) § 26.978(1).
81
Detroit Trust Co. v. Mason, 309 Mich. 281, 15 N.W. (2d) 475 (1944).
82
272 App. Div. 205, 69 N.Y.S: (2d) 763 (1947). No such requirement was
mentioned in Thompson v. Willson, 183 Misc. 949, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 665 (1944), and
New Yorlc City Housing Authority v. Philmo Garage Corp., 187 Misc. 413, 63 N.Y.S.
(2d) 236 (1946).
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not necessary to complete a gratuitous transaction.83 In another case 84
a party was allowed to enforce a prior contract even though a subsequent contract had been entered into covering the same subject matter
and imposing additional restrictions on him. The court declared that
there was no indication of intenti_on to abandon rights under the first
contract. These two decisions indicate that the application of the statute
may easily be restricted if the court is so inclined.
One problem is that of distinguishing between a· modification and
an independent gratuitous promise. A promise by a husband that he
would not change the status of his wife as beneficiary of insurance policies, made after a separation agreement had been entered into, was held
to be a modification. 85 On the other hand, a promise to reimburse one
p'arty for tools used in completing a contract, made after full performance, was held to be a purely gratuitous promise which was not covered
by the statute.86
In Spector v. National Cellulose Corp. 31 it was held that an enforceable modification can be made for the benefit of third parties.
The case involved an agreement by a mortgagee with the mortgagor
that he would subordinate his mortgage to certain junior liens.
d. Assignments and releases. The problem of gratuitous ass~gnments and releases is essentially one of property law.88 The question is
not one of the enforcement of promises. The difficulty is that unless
the strict requirements of property law are complied with, gratuitous
assignments are revocable and gratuitous releases i~effective.89 The
formalities of the law of gifts sometimes are not suitable for the trans38 Informal contracts which require no consideration require ~o showing of mutual
assent. I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, c. 7 (1936); I CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 85
(1932). Sealed instruments and deeds require no acceptance. I WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, § 213 (1936); I CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 105-6 (1932).
.
84
1
United States Navigation Co. v. Black Diamond Lines, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 124
F. (2d) 508; reversing (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 37 F. Supp, 1005.
35
Salinas v. Salinas, 187 Misc. 509; 62 N.Y.S. (2d) 385 (194'6).
86
Aldine Metal Products Co. v. Bogert and Carlough Co., 270 App. Div. 897, 61
N.Y.S, (2d) 71 (1946).
37
181 Misc. 465, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 234 (1943). If no acceptance is required a
communication to a third party might well be held to satisfy the statute.
ss BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY,§ 58 (1936).
39
Assignment, 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 438 A (1936); 1 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 158 (1932). Releases, 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1820 (1938); 2
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 402 (1) (1932). Many states have passed statutes authorizing the discharge of contracts by a simple writing. See citations, 1 W1LLISTON,
CoNTRACTs, § 120, note 9 (1936). A statute to the effect that an unsealed writing is
to have the same effect as though it were sealed would apparently make written releases and assignments effective without consideration even though absence of consideration could be shown as a defense to a written contract. Such statutes are found
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 26.1; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-1601 [492];
Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) § 66-215.
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fer of contract clai_ms. In order to provide a simple procedure the New
York Legislature adopted the following statute:
"A written instrument, hereafter executed, which purports to
be a total or partial release of all claims, debts, demands or obligations, or a total or partial release of any particular claim, debt, demand or obligation, or a release or discharge in whole or in part of
a mortgage, lien or charge on personal or real property, shall not be
invalid because of the absence of consideration of a seal." 40
"An assignment hereafter made shall not be denied the effect
of irrevocably transferring the assignor's rights because of the
absence of consideration, if such assignment is in writing and
signed by the assignor, or by his agent." 41
The section on releases calls for a writing but makes, no mention of
a signature. Certainly the instrument of release would have to come
from the releasor. A "paid" stamp on an invoice would probably be a
binding release. If the writing is retained by the releasor, as if an entry
is made in books of account, the effect of the writing as a release is
problematical.
The statute also provides a method by which an enforceable gratuitous promise ma.y be made. 42 If a transaction were made in the form
of a bargain with one party subsequently executing a release of the consideration due him, the party in whose favor the release runs could
set it up if sued, but could apparently demand that the other party
perform his part of the transaction.
'
e. Conclusion on specific proposals. In most of the situations discussed above the courts proceeding under the common law have not
applied the doctrine of consideration consistently, with the result that
reasonable expectations are often defeated. Statutory modification is a
sensible solution. The New York experience, however, shows that even
a statute drafted after the most careful deliberation will leave uncertainties when an attempt is made t9 change basic doctrines of the law.
But there is no certainty in the existing law,' and if the statutes give a
desirable impetus to the course of the law, then complete certainty
should not be demanded.
Problems considered by the New York commission but on which no
specific recommendations were made are those of charitable subscrip:...
tions 48 gratuitous business promises,44 and promises inducing substantial
40

N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law (McKinney, 1945) § 243.
N.Y. Personal Property Law (McKinney, 1945) §, 33(4), N.Y. Real Property
Law (McKinney, 1945) § 279(3).
42
Suggested by Lloyd, "Consideration and the Seal-An Inadequate Legislative
Program," 46 CoL. L. REV. 1 at 26 (1946).
48
New York Law Rev. Comm., Leg. Doc. 65M, p. 41 (1941).
44
Id. at pp. 49-51.
41

66
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reliance/ 5 The English committee considered the last of these and approved the position taken by the Restatement.4'3 The courts have gone
far toward making promises to charities enforceable without. consideration.47 The other two situations probably should not be dealt with
through legislation because the law has not yet developed sufficiently
and the possible difficulties cannot be easily foreseen. The danger in
passing a statute prematurely is that the terms of the statute may be·
held to be exclusive and that the growth of the law will thereby be
stunted.48
A serious question about the New York reforms is the requirement
that promises enforceable without consideration be in writing. This
requirement creates a new series of Statute of Frauds cases and borrows
the unfortunate history of the construction of that statute. The parts of
the New York statute dealing with assignments, releases, and past con- sideration involve gratuities for the most part, and the requirement of
writing may be justifiable on the ground that it provides for greater
deliberatiop. and furnishes convincing evidence. On the other hand, the
sections relating to offers and to modification of contracts will undoubtedly become important in commercial transactions. Does not the
requirement of writing in such cases interfere with customary business
procedures? Suppose A writes B making an offer irrevocable under
the terms of the statute, and later receives assurance over the telephone
that the offer is to be considered as withdrawn. B might still be able
to accep't the offer because his assent to its withdrawal was neither in
writing nor for consideration. That the courts may be lenient in construing the requirement of writing is indicated by a decision holding
that the actual performance of duties of which one party had been relieved by a modification operated to rescind the modification and reinstate the original agreement.49 In contrast to New York the English
Committee recornmende~ that the Statute of Frauds be repealed alNew York Law Rev. Comm., Leg. Doc. 65 D, pp. 67-68 (1936).
Great Britain Law Rev. Comm., 6th Int. Rep., 1f 50 (8) (1937); l CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT, § 90 (1932).
47 See opinion in I and I Holding Company v. Gainsburg, 276 N.Y. 427, u N.Ei
(2d) 532 (1938); 29 GEo. L. J. 245 (1940); Billig, "The Problem of Consideration
in Charitable Subscriptions," 12 CoRN. L. Q. 467 (1927), reprinted in SELECTED
REAl>INGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT 542 ( l 93 l).
48 On reliance by the promisee as a basis for enforcement see Shattuck, "Gratuitons
Promises-A New Writ?" 35 M1cH. L. REv. 908 (1937); cases cited in RESTAT.&MENT IN THE CouRTS 367-371 (1944) •.
49 Kane Realty Cb. v. National Childrens' Stores, 169 Misc. 699, 8 N.Y.S. (:id)
505 (1938). In contrast, the endorsement of a check containing a statement on the
back that it was given in full payment of rent was held not sufficient to modify the rent
reserved in the lease. Pape v. Rudolph Brothers, 257 App. Div. 1032, 13 N.Y.S. (2d)
781 (1939), affirmed without opinion, 282 N.Y. 692, 26 N.E. (2d) 817 (1940).
4n

4 «1
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most in its entirety and specifically recommended that all of the promises made enforceable in New York if in writing be enforced without a
writing.50 Past experience with the Statute of Frauds raises serious
doubts about the wisdom of extending it.
A :final inguiry should be made as to what remains of the doctrine
of consideration if such sweeping exceptions are established. Does the
conclusion of the studies suggest that the whole doctrine is faulty? In
the following section proposals for the abrogation of consideration in its
entirety in certain forms of contract will be considered.

Proposals for enforcement of promises in particular forms
without consideration
Should not the promisor's intent to be legally bound be sufficient of
itself to make a promise enforceable? If so, the problem to be solved is
that of providing a formality which will show an unmistakable intent
· to be bound. Nobody has yet suggested that every promise be made
legally enforceable.
A promise under seal was enforceable without consideration at common law, but usually absence of consideration can now be set up as a
defense to an action on a sealed instrument.51 The importance of the
seal has declined because the seal is not adapted to customs of the
present day, not because of a conviction that all legally enforceable
promises should be for consideration. Without the seal, however, the
:fictitious bargain is the only method for making an enforceable gratuitous promise, and this method is not at all dependable. 52 Consequently,
several proposals have been made for new types of formal contracts.
a. The Model Written Obligations Act. Professor Williston
drafted the Model Written Obligations Act, which was approved by
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in r925. 58 The express
purpose was to provide a simple formality by which enforceable
2.

50

1m

Great Britain Law Rev. Comm., 6th Int. Rep.,
1-16, 50 (1) (1937).
l WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,§§ 217-218 (1936).
52
Lloyd, "Consideration and the Seal-An Unsatisfactory Legislative Program,"
46 CoL. L. REV. l at 25 (1946); Mason, "Consideration-A Comparative View," 41
CoL. L. REv. 825 at 836 (1941); l CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 75, comment b
(1932); 27 M1cH. L. REv. 314 (1929); 24 CoL. L. REV. 896 (1924); GRISMORE,
CoNTRACTS, § 60 ( l 947) •
58
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 215 (1925). Because of the unenthusiastic reception of the act it was redesignated a Model Act in 1943. HANDBOOK 153 (1943). Favorable comments are
found 76 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 580 (1928); 21 lowA L. REV. 621 (1936); 3 UNiv.
CHI. L. REV. 312 (1936). Unfavorable comments are found, Steele, "The Uniform
Written Obligations Act-A Criticism," 21 ILL. L. REv. 185 (1926); 14 A.B.A.J.
348 (1928); New York Law Rev. Comm., Leg. Doc., 65M, pp. 36-39 (1941). Only
Steele disputes the proposition that parties should be capable of making legally binding
gratuitous promises if they so intend.
61

68
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gratuitous promises could be made. The act has been adopted only by
Utah and Pennsylvania,54 and reads as follows:
"A written release or promise, hereafter made and signed by
the person releasing or promising, shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration if the writing also contains a:n
additional express statement, in any form or language, that the
signer intends to be legally bound."
What constitutes an express statement of intent to be legally bound
cannot be determined with certainty. That the statement must be an
additional statement indicates that a mere promise is not enough, but in
oue decision it was suggested that the repetition of a promise might
satisfy the statute. 55 If a promissory note contains provisions for security 56 or for the confession of judgment 57 the test of the law is apparently met.
One decision shows that a promisor might include a statement of
intent to be bound quite accidentally.58 Defendant wrote to a firm of
attorneys requesting information about the debts of his father, and included in the letter a statement which the court found to indicate an
intent to be legally bound. Yet it is apparent that defendant followed
the form of the statute quite acciqentally, and his intent to be legally
bound is doubtful since he did not even know the amount of the debts.
A dilemma appears--either the defendant may be held to a gratuitous
promise made by accident, or else there will be no certainty under the
statute because the question of actual intent may always be litigated.
The purpose of the act is to establish a form, but the form set up is one
which might be complied with 1J.nintentionally. Be~ause of this striking
defect the reception of the act has been unenthusiast;c.
b. The English proposal. The English Law Revision Committee.
proposed that /all promises be enforced which are in writing, the requirement of consideration being limited to oral promises-.59
By the terms of this recommendation every promise which is expressed in writing would constitute a formal contract. The proposal is
not solely for the purpose of providing a form which may be used deliberately by those_ who wish to make gratuitous obligations which are
\

.

Utah Laws (1929) c. 62; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1936) 33,6. The act is to a
certain extent superfluous in Pennsylvania because there the seal retains much of its
original force. Central-Penn National Bank v. Tinkler, 351 Pa. 123, 40 A (2d) 389
. (1945).
55 Gilmore v. Kessler, (Northumberland Co., Pa. 1934) 22 D. & C. 274.
56 Ibid.
'
57 United Plate Glass Co. v. Burg, 22 Wash. Co. (Pa.) Rep. 155 (1941).
58 Galvanori & Nevy Bros. v. Acquadro, (Lackawanna Co., Pa. 1942) 46 D. & C.
358.
.
'1>9 Great Britain Law Rev. Comm., 6th Int. Rep., 1f 50 (2) (1937).
54
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legally binding. If the form is complied with then the promise is apparently enforceable whether intended to be so or not.
Several devices would be available to the courts if hardship resulted
from a gratuitous promise. A statement might be found to be a declaration of intention rather than a promise. If circumstances change, a
promisor might be excused on the ground that he w-0uld not have intended to be bound if he had foreseen what actually happened.60 The
courts will undoubtedly find a way to mitigate hardships if all written
_promises are made enforceable, but this can only be at the expense of
certainty.
If the English proposals become law it is certain that promises will
be enforceable which were not made with any intent to assume legal
obligations. Is there any showing of advantage sufficient to offset this
difficulty? A study of the committee's report leads one to believe that
the proposal was the result of dissatisfaction with the illogical and inconsistent aspects of the law of consideration, and that no showing was
made of a need indicated by experience to enforce all written promises.
Without a showing of practical advantage the recommendation appears
to be a dubious expedient.
c. Other proposals. The New York commission considered the
need for a new formal contract but came to the conclusion that the preferable course was to correct only specific deficiencies and that no general form for the making of enforceable gratuitous promises was necessary. 61 The sections of the.New York statute on releases and modifications may permit the making of an enforceable gratuitous promise by a
procedure akin to the feigned bargain.
Unless we are willing to go to the extent proposed by the English
Committee, the search should be for a form of contract which will indicate clearly the intent to assume a legal obligation but which is not
likely to be used without such intent. This purpose can best be achieved
by requiring formalities such as are now in use for other formal instruments, such as acknowledgment or attestation. 62

3. Conclusions
The conclusions expressed in the two comprehensive studies discussed above indicate that future changes may be expected. The doc- _
trine of consideration is the product of experience, and there is no
60

See discussion by Hamson, "The Reform of Consideration" 54 L. Q. REV. 233
(1938).
•
61
New York Law Rev. Comm., Leg. Doc. 65M, p. 39 (1941). This solution is
severely criticized by Lloyd, "Consideration and the Seal in New York-An Inadequate Legislative Program/' 46 CoL. L'. REv. I (1946).
62
This was the conclusion reached by Decker, "The Case of the Sealed Instrument in Illinois," 1 ILL. L. BuL. 65 (1917); id. 138 at 171 (1918).
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doubt that it will remain the primary standard-of promissory enforceability. Specific injustices and uncertainties may be relieved by legislation, but problems which cannot be narrowly channeled must be subjecteq to further judicial development. Perhaps recent criticisms will
cause the courts to realize the truth of the proposition that consideration is not-the only criterion for the enforcement of informal promises,
but the doctrine cannot be summarily abolished. The consequences of
basic changes in the law are too unpredictable. Unless a need for legislation is shown by experience there is no assurance that legislative action
will bring about gains sufficient to offset the difficulties and uncertainties which are sure to result.
Charles B. Blackmar, S.Ed.

